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This paper examines the behavior of Spanish siquiera, a scalar particle that al-
ways associates with minimal semantic values. As we will see in sections 2 and 3,
siquiera is licensed in a number of downward entailing environments, in modal con-
texts, and in questions, where it triggers a negative bias, just like English even does
when it associates with a minimal value. Section 1 surveys some relevant back-
ground on even and the bias that it triggers in questions. Guerzoni (2004) shows
that the negative bias triggered by even can be captured by assuming that even is a
low likelihood particle (Karttunen and Peters 1979). We will see in section 3 that
the bias triggered by siquiera does not seem amenable to the same type of analysis.
Section 4 concludes by sketching an analysis of siquiera inspired by the ‘domain
widening’ theory of even presented in van Rooij 2003.
1. Even.
Since Karttunen and Peters 1979, even is standardly analyzed as a presupposition
trigger devoid of any truth-conditional content (Rooth 1985, Wilkinson 1996). Un-
der this view, the sentence in (1), with focus on Bill, asserts that Bill likes Mary and
conveys the ‘low likelihood presupposition’ that, of all relevant individuals, Bill is
the least likely person to do so. If Polly and Molly were the individuals under con-
sideration, even would contribute the presupposition that the proposition that Bill
likes Mary is less likely than any of the alternative propositions in (2).1
(1) Even BILL likes Mary. (Karttunen and Peters 1979: 11)
(2) {that Polly likes Mary, that Molly likes Mary}
Thanks to Sandra Barriales, Reyes Coll-Tellechea, Susana Huidobro, Luisa Martı´, Norberto
Moreno Quibe´n, Isabel Pe´rez, Juan Romeu, and Esther Torrego for judgements. I am also grateful
to four SALT anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, and to the conference participants
that helped me see through my ideas — Larry Horn and Craigie Roberts come to my mind now, but
I probably forget others, my apologies to them. All mistakes are, of course, my own. This work was
funded by a Joseph P. Healey grant from the University of Massachusetts Boston.
1Karttunen and Peters (1979) use the term ‘conventional implicature’ for what we would call
today a presupposition. They claim that even also presupposes than at least one of the alternatives
is true. Krifka (1991a), von Stechow (1991) and Rullmann (1997) have challenged this claim. The
claim that even conveys that the assertion is less likely than any of the alternatives or that it is the
endpoint of a pragmatic scale (Fauconnier 1975) has also been challenged. Francescotti (1995)
argues that even conveys that the assertion outranks most of the alternatives, and Kay (1990) that it
is less likely than a contextually salient proposition.
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The alternative propositions that the low likelihood presupposition makes
reference to depend on the placement of focus. With focus on Mary, (3a) presup-
poses that Mary is the least likely person for Bill to give a book to: if the relevant
individuals were Polly andMolly, evenwould convey that the proposition expressed
by (3a) is less likely than any of the ones in (3b). With focus on a book, (3a) pre-
supposes that a book is the least likely thing for Bill to give Mary: if the relevant
presents were a ball and a doll, even would convey that the proposition expressed
by (3a) is less likely than any of the ones in (3c).
(3) a. Bill has even given Mary a book.
b. {that Bill has given Polly a book, that Bill has given Molly a book}
c. {that Bill has given Mary a ball, that Bill has given Mary a doll}
Before proceeding any further, some explicit assumptions about even are
in order. For the sake of concreteness, we will assume, as in Schwarz 2005, that
even is a focus-sensitive operator that takes two arguments: a covert free variable
ranging over sets of propositions (written as a subscript C) and a proposition (its
‘prejacent’). We will also assume that focused constituents are marked at LF by
means of a subscript F. The LF of the sentence in (1) will then look as in (4):
(4) evenC [[Bill]F likes Mary]
To capture the focus sensitivity of even, we will assume an Alternative Semantics
for focus (Rooth 1985, 1992) and impose the condition that the value of C has to
be a subset of the focus value of the prejacent of even. In Rooth’s framework, the
focus value of a propositional constituent κ is the set of propositions that contains
the proposition expressed by κ as well as all those propositions that can be obtained
by replacing the focus-marked constituent in κ with any constituent of the same
semantic type. The focus value of the prejacent of even in (4), then, is the set that
contains any proposition of the form ‘that x likes Mary.’ Under these assumptions,
we will say that the semantics maps the LF in (4) to the proposition that Bill likes
Mary only when the conditions in (5) are met.2
(5) a. Focus restriction: C ⊆ {p|∃x[p= that x likes Mary]}
b. Low likelihood presupposition:
i. ∀p ∈C[p 6= JBill likes MaryK→ p >c JBill likes MaryK]
ii.
⋂
C >c JBill likes MaryK
2The definedness conditions in (5b) are meant to capture the low likelihood component (Krifka
1995: 227). The abbreviation ‘p < c q’ expresses that proposition p is less likely than proposition
q, given the information in the common ground c (the information state that represents the shared
beliefs of the parties involved in the conversation.) The condition in (5b-ii) makes sure that the
common ground supports the possibility that all individuals under consideration like Mary but Bill
doesn’t. If, given the common ground information, it were true that if Bill likes Mary, then every-
body else does too, the proposition that Bill likes Mary would not be truly unlikely.
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Consider now the sentence in (6) below. With focus on Bill, (6) conveys the
‘high likelihood’ presupposition that Bill is the most likely person to like Mary. As
illustrated in (7), there are two possible LFs for (6). Under the current analysis, LF
correctly requires Bill to be the most likely person to like Mary, because, under the
scope of even, negation reverses the polarity of the low likelihood presupposition:
assuming that (8) is the value ofC, the low likelihood presupposition would require
Bill to be less likely not to like Mary than Polly or Molly. Yet, since presupposi-
tions survive embedding under negation (Karttunen 1973), the interpretation of LF
should inherit the presuppositions of (4), and, so, contrary to fact, there should be a
reading of (6) under which Bill is required to be the least likely person to like Mary.
Either even does not always convey low likelihood or (6) cannot have LF.
(6) Not even BILL likes Mary. (Karttunen and Peters 1979: 11)
(7) LF: evenC [not [[Bill]F likes Mary]] LF: not [evenC [[Bill]F likes Mary]]
(8) {that Polly does not like Mary, that Molly does not like Mary}
Karttunen and Peters (1979) endorse the view that even always conveys low
likelihood and maintain that LF is not well-formed because even is a positive po-
larity item. This analysis (from now on ‘the Scope Theory’) has been defended in
Wilkinson 1996, Guerzoni 2003 and Nakanishi 2006, but it has also come under
attack (see, for instance, Rooth 1985, Rullmann 1997, Herburger 2003 and Gian-
nakidou 2007.) Rooth (1985) observes that even conveys high likelihood in contexts
where negative polarity items are licensed and proposes that the perceived low and
high likelihood presuppositions correspond to two different (but homophonous) lex-
ical items. Under this view (from now on ‘the NPI theory’), (6) has the two LFs in
(9): LF contains a PPI that triggers a low likelihood presupposition, and LF an
NPI that triggers a high likelihood presupposition.
(9) LF: even-PPIC [not [[Bill]F likes Mary]] LF: not [even-NPIC [[Bill]F likes Mary]]
The analysis of the behavior of even in questions has recently been taken
to provide indirect support for the Scope Theory (Guerzoni 2003, 2004). Ques-
tions containing minimizers, like the ones in (10), cannot be used as disinterested
information requests because they are ‘negatively biased’ — they convey that the
speaker expects a negative answer (Borkin 1971, Ladusaw 1980). Questions con-
taining even are similarly biased when even associates with a constituent that de-
notes a minimal value: in a context where Pedro is more likely to speak proper
Spanish than proper French or Italian, the question in (11) signals that, contrary to
what is expected, the speaker suspects that Pedro cannot speak proper Spanish.
(10) a. Does Charlie bat an eye when you threaten him? (Borkin 1971: 53)
b. Did anyone lift a finger to help? (Ladusaw 1980: 186)
(11) Pedro can’t speak proper French. He can’t speak proper Italian . . . Can he
even speak proper Spanish?
Guerzoni (2003, 2004) shows that the Scope Theory can derive this bias. She as-
sumes that yes/no questions contain a silent whether, which introduces a negation
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into the semantic representation, and shows that, as a result of the scopal interac-
tion of even with this negation, when even associates with a constituent denoting a
minimal value, the question will have only one answer whose presuppositions will
be satisfied in a natural context. To illustrate the analysis, consider (12):
(12) a. Can Pedro speak proper Spanish?
b. {JIPK,¬JIPK}hhhh((((
whether λ f 〈st,st〉.{ f (JIPK)}hhhhh(((((
1 {Jt〈st,st〉Kg(JIPK)}hhhhhh((((((
Q : λ p.{p} Jt〈st,st〉Kg(JIPK)hhhhh(((((
t〈st,st〉 IP
Pedro can speak proper Spanish
In this derivation, the Q(uestion) operator creates a proto-question (Karttunen 1977)
— it lifts the denotation of its sister from a proposition to a set of propositions, the
type of questions. A silent whether makes sure that this set contains the denotation
of the IP and its negation. This silent whether is analyzed as in (13): it denotes the
characteristic function of the set containing the identity function over propositions
and negation. It starts the derivation as the sister of the IP, but moves above Q for
type reasons, leaving a trace of type 〈st,st〉. The sister of the moved whether is
interpreted by abstracting over that trace: it maps any function f of type 〈st,st〉 to
the set containing the proposition that results from applying f to the denotation of
the IP.Whether combines with this function via a generalized version of Karttunen’s
Wh-Quantification Rule (Karttunen 1977: 19), yielding the set that contains the
propositions that result from applying the denotation of the IP to the functions in
the set whose characteristic function whether denotes.
(13) JwhetherK = λh〈〈st,st〉,t〉.∃g〈st,st〉[[(g= λ p.p)∨ (g= λ p.¬p)] & h(g)]
Assuming that even is a propositional operator, this LF leaves two possible
attachment sites for even — right above or right below the trace of whether. When
even scopes under the trace of whether, the LF denotes the first set in (14). When
even scopes over the trace of whether, the second. These sets share one proposi-
tion (the positive answer to the question), which results from applying even to the
denotation of the IP. This proposition is defined only in worlds in which it is less
likely than any of its alternatives, which are propositions of the form ‘that Pedro can
speak proper x’ (assuming that Spanish is focused.) When even scopes under nega-
tion, as in the first set in (14), the negative answer to the question will inherit the
presuppositions of the positive answer. When it scopes over the trace of whether, as
in the second set in (14), the negative answer to the question will be defined only if
the proposition that Pedro does not speak proper Spanish is less likely than any of
the alternatives, which are propositions of the form ‘that Pedro cannot speak proper
x.’ If we assume that Pedro is more likely to speak proper Spanish than any other
contextually relevant language, none of the answers to the question in (11) will be
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defined when even scopes under the trace of whether. When even scopes over the
trace of whether, only the negative answer will be defined. The bias, in this account,
is due to the fact that the speaker utters a question with only one assertable answer
— the negative.
(14) {JevenC(IP)K,¬JevenC(IP)K},{JevenC(IP)K,JevenCK(¬J(IP)K)}
The Scope Theory provides a very elegant account of the negative bias trig-
gered by even, then. This raises a natural typological question: to what extent
can this account derive the negative bias triggered by other scalar items in other
languages? This paper contributes to answering this question by examining the
behavior of Spanish siquiera, a high likelihood scalar particle.
2. Spanish Scalar Particles: Siquiera.
Spanish has a number of scalar particles: hasta, incluso, ni, and siquiera. Hasta and
incluso convey low likelihood and are positive polarity items (Schwenter 2002). Ni
is a negative concord item (henceforth ‘NCI’) (Herburger 2003) that conveys high
likelihood (the version of (15a) with ni is deviant if Pedro is not likely to speak
Chinese.) Like other NCIs in Spanish, which is a ‘non-strict’ negative concord
language, ni requires the preverbal negative marker no in unembedded episodic
sentences when it occurs in postverbal position; in preverbal position, ni excludes
no, as (15) illustrates.3 Given its intimate connection with negation and its high
likelihood component, one could be tempted to identify ni with Rooth’s NPI even.
However, the distribution of Spanish NCIs does not follow the distribution of En-
glish NPIs of the any type (Penka 2007), and the distribution of ni doesn’t either
(Guerzoni 2004): like other NCIs, ni is licensed under doubt or without, but not
under factive emotives, in the antecedent of conditionals, the first argument of uni-
versal nominal quantifiers, or in questions.
(15) a. Pedro
Pedro
no
not
habla
speaks
*( ni)
NI
chino.
Chinese
‘Pedro doesn’t even speak Chinese.’
b. Ni
NI
Pedro
Pedro
(* no)
no
habla
speaks
chino.
Chinese
‘Not even Pedro speaks Chinese.’
Ni frequently co-occurs with siquiera, as in (16). The addition of siquiera to
ni does not seem to bring about any meaning change: just like (15a), (16) conveys
(i) that Pedro does not speak Chinese, and (ii) that he is likely to do so. This
is reminiscent of what happens when even is added to a minimizer in a negative
3The term ‘non-strict negative concord’ is established in Giannakidou (2000). ‘#(X)’ / ‘*(X)’ are
used to indicate that a sentence is deviant/ungrammatical without X. ‘(#X)’ / ‘(*X)’ indicate that a
sentence is deviant/ungrammatical with X.
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context (Pott 1859, Schmerling 1971, Heim 1984): the versions of (17) with and
without even also feel equivalent.4
(16) Pedro
Pedro
no
not
habla
speaks
ni
NI
siquiera
SIQUIERA
chino.
Chinese
‘Pedro does not even speak Chinese.’
(17) Pedro did not (even) lift a finger to help Mary.
Since it frequently co-occurs with ni, it should not come out as a surprise
that siquiera has only been discussed in the semantic literature in connection with
this NCI (Herburger 2003, Guerzoni 2004). However, as we have just seen, ni does
not require siquiera and, as we will see next, siquiera does not require ni either.
Siquiera is deviant in positive episodic sentences (both in preverbal and postverbal
position, unlike ni), as (18) illustrates, but it is licensed in a variety of ‘negative’
environments, where it can occur without ni. The naturally occurring examples in
(19) show that siquiera is licensed by sentential negation (19a), by preverbal NCIs
(nadie, ningu´n, nunca) (19b), and under the scope of the ‘negative’ preposition sin
(‘without’) (19c). These examples are arguably all cases where siquiera is licensed
by sentential negation, since NCIs (both preverbal and postverbal) have been argued
to be licensed by a covert form of sentential negation (Zeijlstra 2004, Penka 2007),
which without constituents can host (Penka 2007: 58). We also find siquiera under
the scope of doubt (20), and apenas (‘hardly’) (21).
(18) (* Siquiera)
SIQUIERA
Pedro
Pedro
hablo´
speaks
(* siquiera)
SIQUIERA
portugue´s.
Portuguese
(19) a. Ese
that
sinvergu¨enza
scoundrel
que
that
se
se
hace
makes
pasar
pass
por
for
“director
director
de
of
orquesta
orchestra
y
and
compositor”
composer
no
not
sabe
knows
siquiera
SIQUIERA
leer
read
mu´sica.
music
‘That scoundrel that pretends to be an orchestra conductor and a compos-
itor does not even know how to read music.’
(personales.ya.com/remocpi/El superultramegaego de Luis Cobos.htm)
b. La
The
mayorı´a
majority
de
of
nosotros
us
{nunca
{never
/
/
*alguna vez}
at some point}
habı´amos
had
estado
been
siquiera
SIQUIERA
en
in
una
a
comisarı´a
station
de
of
policı´a
police
y
and
de repente
suddenly
llegamos
got
a
to
un
a
penal
prison
de
of
ma´xima
maximum
seguridad.
security
‘Most of us had never even been to a police station and, suddently, we
arrived at a maximum security prison.’
(Alegrı´a, C. et alt. (1992) Fuga de Canto Grande, UCA Editores, p. 54)
4Thanks to Larry Horn for pointing out to me that the observation that negative sentences con-
taining a minimizer are equivalent to their counterparts containing even traces back to Pott (1859:
410). See Horn (1989: 452-453).
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c. Creı´a
he thought
que
that
Marı´a
Marı´a
la
the
Coja
Lame
estarı´a
would be
en
in
el
her
estudio,
studio
pero
but
habı´a
she had
desaparecido
disappeared
sin
without
dejar
leaving
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
a
nota.
note
‘He thought that Marı´a the Lame would be in her office, but she had dis-
appeared without even leaving a note.’
(R. del Pozo, La novia (1995) Plaza y Jane´s, Barcelona.)
(20) No
not
existen
exist
planes
plans
de
to
hacer
do
tal
such
cosa.
thing
Dudo
I doubt
que
that
siquiera
SIQUIERA
alguien
somebody
lo
it
haya
has
planteado.
proposed
‘There aren’t plans to do such a thing. I doubt anybody could have even
proposed it.’(http://archives.postgresql.org)
(21) Los
The
representantes
representatives
de
of
los
the
empleados
employeers
apenas
hardly
hemos
have
sido
been
capaces
capable
siquiera
SIQUIERA
de
of
ponernos
putting-us
en
in
contacto
touch
con
with
la
the
direccio´n
direction
del
of-the
centro.
center
‘We, the employee representatives, have hardly had a chance to even get in
touch with the center’s management.’ (http://blog.eldelweb.com)
Minimizers, ni, and other NCIs are licensed in the contexts in (19-21). How-
ever, siquiera is also licensed in environments that allow for NPIs of the English any
type (Krifka 1991b) but exclude ni and other NCIs: the antecedent of conditionals
(subjunctive (22), but also indicative), before (but not after) clauses (23), the stan-
dard clause of excessive (too) (but not of assecutive (enough)) constructions (24),
and questions (matrix, as in (25), but also embedded.)
(22) Si
if
el
the
fu´tbol
soccer
atendiera
follo:subj
siquiera
SIQUIERA
un
a
poco
bit
a
to
la
the
lo´gica,
logic,
el
the
Barcelona
Barcelona
arrolları´a
would crush
al
to-the
Getafe.
Getafe
‘If soccer followed logic even a bit, the Barcelona would crush the Getafe.’
(prensa.vlex.es/vid/rijkaard-dice-supo-27753021)
(23) Gabriel
Gabriel
habı´a
had
cruzado
crossed
la
the
calle
street
{
{
antes
before
/
/
(*despue´s)
after
de
of
}
}
siquiera
SIQUIERA
pensar
think
en
in
lo
what
que
that
estaba
he was
haciendo.
doing
‘G. had crossed the street before even thinking about what he was doing.’
(S. Laurens (2006) Un amor secreto, (J. Fondebrider, trans.) Ediciones B,
Mexico, p.110)
(24) El
The
clima
weather
del
of-the
viernes
Friday
era
was
{
{
demasiado
too
/
/
*bastante
*enough
}
}
malo
bad
para
to
siquiera
SIQUIERA
intentar
try
un
a
lanzamiento.
launching
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‘The Friday weather was too bad to even try a launching.’
(www.reforma.com/ciencia/articulo/716689/)
(25) ¿Has
have
leı´do
read
siquiera
SIQUIERA
el
the
tı´tulo
title
del
of-the
post?
post
‘Have you even read the post title?’ (http://vagos.wamba.com/)
Finally, siquiera is licensed in a number of modal constructions where ni
is not licensed: under the future tense (26), in imperatives (in requests and orders
(27a), and also in offers (27b)), in optatives (often with the adverb ojala´ ‘I wish
that’, as in (28)), with necessity modals (tener que ‘have to’ (29a) or deber ‘ought
to’ (29b)), and also with directive propositional attitudes (30).
(26) ¡Tu´
you
y
and
yo,
I
Rusca,
Rusca
comeremos
will-eat
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
one
vez
time
al
at-the
dı´a
day
lo
the
bueno
good
de
of
la
the
tierra!
earth
‘You and I, Rusca, will eat good produce at least once a day.’
(Sampedro, J.L. (1985) La sonrisa etrusca, Alfaguara, Madrid.)
(27) a. De´me
give-me
siquiera
SIQUIERA
un
a
vaso
glass
de
of
agua,
water,
me´dico
doctor
de
of
mierda.
shit
‘Give me at least a glass of water, you crappy doctor.’
(Vallejo, Alfonso (1980) Eclipse, La Torre, Madrid [Corpus R.A.E])
b. Hala,
come-on,
mujer,
girl,
toma
have
un
a
cafe´
coffee
con
with
leche
milk
siquiera.
SIQUIERA
‘Come on, girl, have at least a cafe´ con leche!’
(Merino, J.M., (1987) Novela de Andres Cho. Mondadori, p.113)
(28) a. Ojala´
I wish
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
a
mı´nima
minimun
parte
part
de
of
los
the
trabajadores
workers:masc
y
and
trabajadoras
workers:fem
respondieran
answer:subj
de
of
la
the
forma
form
en
in
que
that
lo
it
han
have
hecho
done
ellos.
they
‘I wish at least a minimum part of the workers answered the same way
they did.’ (madrid.indymedia.org)
b. Desearı´a
I would like
que
that
FM
FM
me
to-me
indicara
indicate:subj
con
with
anticipacio´n
anticipation
siquiera
SIQUIERA
de
of
diez
ten
dı´as
days
que
that
la
the
fecha
date
esta´
is:ind
pro´xima.
soon
‘I’d like FM to remind me at least ten days in advance that the date is
coming soon.’ (www.lawebdelprogramador.com. Forum: 08/01/2009)
(29) a. La
the
compan˜ı´a
company
tiene
has
que
to
pagar
pay
siquiera
SIQUIERA
el
the
60
60
por
per
ciento
cent
del
of-the
salario
salary
completo
complete
promedio.
average
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‘The company has to pay at least sixty per cent of the average complete
salary.’ (espanol.news.yahoo.com)
b. El
the
contenido
content
en
of
C
C
orga´nico
organic
debe
should
ser
be
siquiera
SIQUIERA
un
a
0.6%
0.6%
superior
superior
al
to-the
del
of-the
referido
mentioned
horizonte.
horizon
‘The content of organic C should be at least a 0.6% higher than the content
of the forementioned horizon.’ (http://www.unex.es/edafo/FAO/)
(30) Los
The
conservadores
conservatives
han
have
pedido
asked
(. . . )
(. . . )
que
that
se
se
modifique
modify:subj
siquiera
SIQUIERA
puntualmente
punctually
el
the
Tı´tulo
Title
VIII
VIII
. . .
. . .
‘The Conservatives have asked that the Eighth Title be modified at least
minimally.’ (El Mundo, 10/30/1996 [Corpus R.A.E])
In all these modal cases, siquiera naturally translates as at least (Bosque
1980: 166). The contrast between the NPI contexts (where siquiera naturally trans-
lates as even) and the modal contexts (where it translates as at least) is reminiscent
of the behavior of Greek esto, which sometimes translates as even, and sometimes
as at least (Giannakidou 2007). Like the concessive uses of at least described in
Nakanishi and Rullmann (2009), siquiera associates in these examples (like in the
previous ones) with constituents that denote highly likely scalar values, and evokes
a contrast with other more desirable alternatives. Consider, for instance, the ex-
ample in (26) above: it can be naturally uttered in a scenario in which the speaker
knows that she and Rusca will not eat good earthy food more than once per day,
which would be more desirable. Likewise, the sentence in (27a) can be uttered by
somebody convinced that the doctor will not give her more than a glass of water; it
may be fine for the speaker of (28) if a substantial amount of the workers will not
have responded the way she wants; (29a) is naturally uttered in a scenario in which
the company does not have to pay more than 60% of the average salary; and (30) is
compatible with the Conservatives being happy if the Eighth Title is not modified
substantially.
3. Siquiera in Questions and the Scope Theory.
Having looked at the distribution of siquiera, we will now come back to its behavior
in questions. The examples in (31) below show that, as we pointed out before,
siquiera is licensed in questions, both matrix (31a) and embedded (31b):
(31) a. ¿Hiciste
did
siquiera
SIQUIERA
el
the
intento
attempt
de
to
probar
try
estas
these
soluciones?
solutions
‘¿Have you even made an effort to try these solutions?’
(http://www.forosuse.org/forosuse/archive/)
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b. Me
to-me
pregunto
ask:1s
si
if
tu´
you
siquiera
SIQUIERA
sabes
know
lo
it
que
that
significa
means
ser
to be
iconoclasta.
iconoclast
‘I wonder whether you even know what it means to be an iconoclast.’
(www.antesdelfin.com/foro/printthread.php?t=12102)
We now note that these questions convey a negative bias. They are not appropriate
in contexts in which the speaker suspects that their true answer is positive. Consider,
for instance, (32a). While this question allows for tags like verdad or no (‘right?’)
that indicate a positive bias — that the speaker is seeking to confirm her belief
that her addressee did in fact attemp to try out the solutions — its counterpart with
siquiera does not. Similarly, (32b) is compatible both with a parenthetical that
conveys that the speaker suspects that the true answer is positive and with one that
conveys that he suspects that it is negative. Its counterpart with siquiera, however,
is deviant with the former.
(32) a. ¿Hiciste
did
el
the
intento
attempt
de
to
probar
try
estas
these
soluciones,
solutions
{verdad,
{truth,
no}?
no}?
‘You have made an effort to try these solutions, {right, no}?’
b. Me
to-me
pregunto
ask:1s
si
if
tu´
you
sabes
know
lo
it
que
that
significa
means
ser
to be
iconoclasta
iconoclast
—
—
sospecho
suspect
que
that
sı´
yes
/
/
no.
no
‘I wonder whether you even know what it means to be an iconoclast — I
suspect that you do / that you don’t.’
In questions, like in declarative sentences, siquiera conveys that its prejacent
is likely. It also signals that the issue is settled for the alternative (less likely) propo-
sitions. Consider, for instance, (31a), which is taken from an internet computer user
forum post. The author of the post is complaining about his addressee asking for
help, because he thinks that his problem could have been solved by carrying out the
solutions that other users already suggested. He believes that his addressee has not
carried out those solutions, since he would not be asking for help otherwise. By us-
ing siquiera, he signals that he also believes that his addresse did not do something
easier: at least attempt to give these solutions a try. In (31b) siquiera behaves in
a similar way. The sentence in (31b) is part of a response to a post by “the icono-
clast.” The author of (31b) infers from the choice of nickname that his addressee
claims to be an iconoclast. He thinks he is not. The use of siquiera signals that he
suspects that he does not have the weaker property of knowing what an iconoclast
is.
We have seen in section 1 that the Scope Theory provides a very elegant ac-
count of the negative bias triggered by evenwhen it associates with likely prejacents
(Guerzoni 2004). However, this account does not directly carry over to siquiera.
The reason why this is so has to do with the environments in which siquiera is li-
censed. The Scope Theory analyzes even as a low likelihood scalar particle—when
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even conveys high likelihood, it is because it outscopes a polarity reversing expres-
sion at LF. The analysis of the negative bias of even is based on this assumption:
in questions, when even associates with a likely prejacent, it can still outscope the
(implicit) negation in the negative answer and convey a satisfiable presupposition.
To extend the analysis to siquiera, then, we need to analyze this scalar particle as a
low likelihood item. Since siquiera always seems to convey high likelihood, we are
also forced to assume that it always scopes over a polarity reversing operator. This
assumption is problematic: it may turn out to be true for some, but not for all of the
environments in which siquiera is licensed, since, as we saw in the previous sec-
tion, siquiera is licensed in upward entailing environments, like the nuclear scope
of necessity modals.
For the sake of illustration, let us assume that siquiera is a low likelihood
focus sensitive propositional operator, as in (33):
(33) a. LF: siquieraC [. . . [φ ]F . . .]
b. Focus restriction: C ⊆ J[. . . [φ ]F . . .]K f
c. Low likelihood presupposition:
i. ∀p ∈C[p 6= J[. . . [φ ]F . . .]K→ p >c J[. . . [φ ]F . . .]K]
ii.
⋂
C >c J[. . . [φ ]F . . .]K
Let us now consider the sentence in (34):
(34) Segu´n
according to
su
his
me´dico,
doctor,
Pedro
Pedro
tiene
has
que
to
ir
go
a
to
la
the
piscina
pool
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
one
vez
time
por
per
semana.
week
‘According to his doctor, Pedro has to go swimming at least once per week.’
Since we are assuming that siquiera is a propositional operator, there are
two possible LFs for (34), depending on whether siquiera scopes under (35a) or
over (35b) the necessity modal:5
(35) a.  siquieraC [Pedro goes swimming [once per week]F ]
b. siquieraC  [Pedro goes swimming [once per week]F ]
Consider first (35a). The prejacent of siquiera in (35a) is the proposition that Pedro
goes swimming at least once per week — the sentence in (34) does not claim that
Pedro’s doctor wants him to go swimming exactly once per week. Assuming that
una vez por semana ‘once per week’ is focused, the domain of quantification of
siquiera in (35a) should be (a subset of) (36):
(36) {Pedro goes swimming at least two days per week, Pedro goes swimming at
least three days per week . . . }
5We will assume that the phrase ‘according to his doctor’ restricts the domain of quantification
of the modal which, in this case, should be the set of worlds compatible with what Pedro’s doctor
wants.
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Under the current analysis, the LF in (35a) should then presuppose that, given the
common ground information, the proposition that Pedro goes swimming at least
once per week is less likely than any of the alternative propositions in (36). All
the alternative propositions in (36) asymmetrically entail the prejacent of siquiera.
The relation < c relates to semantic strenght as follows: if propositions p and q are
comparable in their semantic strength — if either p entails q or q entails p — then
if p< c q, we can conclude that p asymmetrically entails q (because for p to be less
likely than q, given the common ground information, there should be less worlds in
the common ground in which p is true than worlds in which q is, so the common
ground should allow for worlds in which q is true but p isn’t, but it should not allow
for worlds in which p is true but q isn’t) (Krifka 1995: 228). This means that under
the analysis in (35a), the sentence in (34) should not be defined for any common
ground, because it could only be defined for common grounds that allow for worlds
in which, for any n> 1, Pedro goes swimming at least n times but not at least once.
Scoping siquiera over the necessity modal does not give us the right presup-
position either. Under the LF in (35b), siquiera requires the proposition that Pedro
is required to go swimming once per week to be less likely, given the common
ground information, that any of the propositions in the set below:
(37) {Pedro has to go swimming at least two days per week, Pedro has to go
swimming at least three days per week . . . }
Yet, the sentence in (34) can be appropriately uttered in a scenario where it is taken
for granted that it is false that Pedro’s doctor requires him to go swimming more
often than once per week, and where, therefore, the likelihood of the alternatives is
zero.
Of course, in positive episodic sentences, like (38) below, siquiera cannot
outscope a polarity reversal expression either. If we assume the low likelihood
analysis, siquiera should still be able to combine with unlikely prejacents. This,
however, does not seem to be the case: the sentence in (38) below is deviant even
in a context where the dean is the most unlikely relevant person to come to the
department party.
(38) * A
to
la
the
fiesta
party
del
of-the
departamento
department
vino
came
siquiera
siquiera
la
the
decana.
dean
Intended: ‘Even the dean came to the department party.’
We need a way to derive the negative bias of siquiera that does not hinge
upon the assumption that this scalar item contributes low likelihood. In the next sec-
tion, we will sketch one, largely inspired by the domain widening analysis of even
put forth in van Rooij 2003, and the extremity condition imposed by minimizers in
Krifka 1995.
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4. Settledness, Minimality and Extremity.
Wewill continue to assume that siquiera takes two arguments: a covert free variable
ranging over sets of propositional alternatives, and a proposition (its ‘prejacent.’)
For the sake of illustration, we will also assume, as before, that focus brings about
the alternatives and determines their shape, and we will continue to take for granted
an alternative semantics for focus (Rooth 1985, 1992), under which expressions
have both an ordinary (J·Ko) and a focus semantic value (J·Kf).With this setup in
mind, we put forth the hypothesis that siquiera imposes two requirements: the first,
which we will call “minimality”, requires the prejacent to be weaker than any of
the alternatives, and the second, which I take from Krifka’s analysis of minimizers
(Krifka 1995: 239) and call, following him, “extremity”, requires that it be taken
for granted that, in all natural common grounds, the proposition that if the prejacent
is true, then no other alternative is true as well should not be more likely than the
proposition that if the prejacent is true, then some other alternative is true as well.6
(39) a. Where JφKo,w∈D〈s,t〉,JsiquieraC φKf,g and JsiquieraC φ ]Ko,w,g are defined iff
the conditions in (i-iii) below are all met:
i. Focus restriction: C ⊆ JφKf
ii.Minimality: ∀p ∈C[p→ JφKo,w]
iii.Extremity: it holds in w that for any natural common ground c,
{w′|JφKo,w(w′)→¬∃p ∈ JφKf[p(w′)]}
≤ c
{w′|JφKo,w(w′)→∃p ∈ JφKf[p(w′)]}
b. When defined, JsiquieraC φKf,g =C, and JsiquieraC φKo,w,g = JφKo,w,g
As in Krifka’s alternative semantics for NPIs (Krifka 1995), we will assume
that the alternatives grow to the top, where they are accessed by a covert speech act
operator that contrasts the prejacent with all other alternatives. Following van Rooij
(2003) analysis of even, we will assume that this operator, which we will call ‘OP-
EVENASSERT’, for lack of a better name, requires the alternatives to be all settled in
the common ground, i.e. to be either true or false, as ilustrated in (40) below. As in
regular assertions, both the prejacent and its negation are required to be compatible
with the common ground. The intuition behind the settledness condition is that
siquiera conveys domain widening: (i) it signals that the issue of whether they are
6I assume a two-dimensional system (Stalnaker 1978) , where sentential constituents are mapped
to a proposition with respect to a ‘context’ world w, which I write as a superscript on the brackets
representing the interpretation function. I drop this superscript when it is irrelevant. We will assume
that common grounds are sets of pairs of worlds and assignments 〈w,g〉. The operation ‘+’ for a
propositional constituent φ is understood as follows:
(i) c+ JφKo,w,g is defined iff for all pairs 〈w,g〉 ∈ c,JφKo,w,g(w) is defined.
When defined, c+ JφKo,w,g = {〈w,g〉 ∈ c|JφKo,w,g(w) = }
For any common ground c, I use the expression ‘W (c)’ to refer to the set of worlds that are in some
pair in c. As before, I useC as both the name of the variable and its value.
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true or false is settled for all propositions in the domain containing the alternatives,
and (ii) it puts forth the claim that that issue is also settled for all propositions in the
wider domain that includes the prejacent.
(40) a. Where JφKo,w,g ∈ D〈s,t〉, OP-EVENASSERT (JφKo,w,g)(c) is defined iff
∀p ∈ JφKf[W (c)⊆ p∨W (c)⊆ ¬p] (settledness)
b. When defined, OP-EVENASSERT (JφKo,w,g)(c) = c+ JφKo,w,g
Let us now consider (41). Suppose that the relevant alternatives are propo-
sitions of the form ‘that Pedro swam at least n times’ (where n> 1) — these alter-
natives satisfy minimality, assuming that the prejacent is the proposition that Pedro
swam at least once. Given the definedness conditions of OP-EVENASSERT, for (41a)
to be defined, all these alternatives must be taken to be either true or false. If it were
common knowledge that Pedro swam at least twice, it would have to be common
knowledge that he swam at least once. In that case, (41a) would already be entailed
by the common ground, and, hence, it would not be assertable. We conclude that
the common ground should entail that Pedro did not swim twice or more often: if
Pedro swam at least once, he did so exactly once. For (41a) to be assertable, there
should be worlds in the common ground in which Pedro did not swim, and worlds in
which he did so at least once — only once, in fact, given the settledness condition.
Given this situation, however, updating the common ground with the information
provided by (41) would result in a non natural common ground that would entail
that Pedro swam only once, and, thus, violate extremity. We will entertain the hy-
pothesis that this is the reason behind the deviance of (41), following the type of
logic that Krifka (1995) appeals to in order to explain the deviance of unembedded
minimizers in positive episodic sentences.
(41) a. * Pedro
Pedro
nado´
swam
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
once
vez.
b. LF: OP-EVENASSERT [siquieraC [ Pedro nado´ [una vez]F ]]
Consider now the two possible LFs for the sentence in (42a) below:
(42) a. Pedro
Pedro
no
not
nado´
swam
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
once
vez.
b. LF: OP-EVENASSERT [not [siquieraC [Pedro nado´ [una vez]F ]]]
c. LF: OP-EVENASSERT [siquieraC [not [Pedro nado´ [una vez]F ]]]
Let us discuss LF first. Given the scope of siquiera, we can assume that,
as before, the relevant alternatives are propositions of the form ‘that Pedro swam at
least n times’ (for n > 1). At the focus semantic level, these alternatives combine
pointwise with negation. The alternatives that the definition of OP-EVENASSERT
makes reference to are then propositions of the form ‘that Pedro did not swim at
least n times’ (for n> 1). OP-EVENASSERT requires all these alternatives to be either
true or false. If they were false, the proposition expressed by (42a) (that Pedro did
not swim at least once) would not be compatible with the common ground, and,
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hence, it would not be assertable. It must be the case, then, that the alternatives
that OP-EVENASSERT sees are all known to be true. Pedro is then known not to have
swum twice or more than twice. For (42b) to be assertable, the common ground
must be compatible both with the proposition that Pedro did not swim and with its
negation — the proposition that he swam at least once. Since Pedro is known not to
have swum twice or more often, for (42b) to be assertable, either Pedro didn’t swim
or he swam only once, a minimal value. The input common ground is a non-natural
one, given the extremity condition. Asserting the proposition expressed by (42c)
eliminates the possibility that Pedro swam only once, yielding a common ground
that satisfies the extremity condition. As for LF, its definedness conditions are
different. Given its scope in (42c), siquiera would need to invoke alternatives of
the form ‘that Pedro did not swim n times’ that would asymmetrically entail ‘that
Pedro did not swim at least once.’ Even if such alternatives existed, for (42c) to
be assertable, we would need to assume that they are all false, and, so, the output
common ground would violate the extremity condition.
Let us go back briefly to the modal sentence in (34). Given our current
assumptions, there are also two possible LFs for this sentence, depending on the
scope of siquiera relative to the modal, as illustrated in (43a-43b) below. Under
the first analysis, in (43a), siquiera requires alternatives of the form ‘that Pedro
swims at least n times’ (for n> 1). These combine pointwise at the focus semantic
level with the modal operator to yield a set of propositional alternatives of the form
of ‘that Pedro is required to swim at least n times’ (for n > 1). OP-EVENASSERT
requires all these alternatives to be settled in the common ground. Since they are
all stronger than the assertion, we can conclude that they must be false, and, so,
the sentence is correctly predicted to be assertable in a context, like the one that we
entertained before, in which they are indeed false. Extremity simply makes sure
that it is common knowledge that Pedro is less likely to go swimming only once
than more often. As before, the reader can verify that LF is associated with an
assertion whose output common ground sistematically violates extremity.
(43) a. LF: OP-EVENASSERT  [siquieraC [Pedro goes to swim [at least once]F ]]
b. LF: OP-EVENASSERT [siquieraC  [Pedro goes to swim [at least once]F ]]
Once the current setup is extended to yes/no questions, the negative bias can
be derived as a way of avoiding a violation of extremity. To see how, let us assume,
again, that the focal alternatives that siquiera constrains grow to the top, where
they are accessed by a covert speech act operator that, in analogy with the case
of assertions, asks whether the prejacent is true or false in case all the alternatives
that siquiera operates over are known to be true or false. As illustrated below, we
assume that a yes/no question maps a common ground c into a set containing the
set of world-assignment pairs in c where the prejacent is true, and the set of world-
assignment pairs in c where the prejacent is false (Krifka 1995: 253). An answer to
the question is felicitous if it eliminates one of the elements in that set.
(44) a. Where JφKo,w,g ∈ D〈s,t〉,OP-EVENQYES/NO(JφKo,w,g)(c) is defined iff
∀p ∈ JφKf[W (c)⊆ p∨W (c)⊆ ¬p] (settledness)
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b. When defined, OP-EVENQYES/NO(JφKo,w,g)(c) = QYES/NO(JφKo,w,g)(c) =
{{〈w,g〉 ∈ c|JφKo,w,g(w) = },{〈w,g〉 ∈ c|JφKo,w,g(w) = }}
Let us consider the question in (45). We will assume, again, that siquiera
requires alternatives of the form ‘that Pedro swam at least n times’ (for n > 1).
OP-EVENQYES/NO requires all these alternatives to be either true or false in the com-
mon ground. For the question in (45) to be uttered felicitously, we can assume
that the issue of whether Pedro swam at least once is not entailed by the common
ground. This means that we need to assume that all the alternatives are false, and
that that the common ground entails that either Pedro didn’t swim or that he swam
only once. This is a question about whether a truly minimal value holds. The parti-
tion that the question performs contains two common grounds: one entails that Pe-
dro swam only once, and the other entails that Pedro did not swim. In answering the
question, the hearer needs to choose between these two possible common grounds.
By answering with a positive answer, the hearer chooses a common ground that en-
tails that Pedro only swam once, and by answering with a negative answer, one that
entails that Pedro didn’t swim. The first common ground violates extremity, but
the second doesn’t. Since it is being taken for granted that a common ground that
violates extremity is not a natural one, the speaker can expect the hearer to choose
the negative answer.
(45) a. ¿Nado´
pro swam
siquiera
SIQUIERA
una
once
vez?
‘Did he swim even once?’
b. LF: OP-EVENYES/NO [siquieraC [pro swam [at least once]F ]]
5. To Conclude.
We have surveyed a number of environments where siquiera is licensed and pointed
out that this particle conveys a negative bias in questions. We have seen that Guer-
zoni (2004) provides an elegant analysis of the bias triggered by even in questions
when it associates with a minimal value. Since this analysis hinges on the assump-
tion that this particle lexically conveys low likelihood, it can be taken to provide
indirect evidence for the Scope Theory of even. Extending this analysis to siquiera
is tempting. However, we have seen that siquiera is licensed in non downward
entailing environments, where it does not seem possible to assume that its lexical
entry conveys low likelihood. As an alternative, we have sketched an analysis under
which siquiera invokes alternatives that are stronger than the assertion and requires
that the proposition that only the prejacent is true should not be more likely than the
proposition that the prejacent and some alternative is true.
In this analysis, the alternatives introduced by siquiera interact with a speech
act operator that imposes a settledness condition. We have seen the effects of this
condition in the case of assertions and direct (yes/no) questions. It still remains to
be seen how other speech acts may be treated. A particularly pressing question is
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what happens with siquiera in indirect questions, where, as we have seen, it also
triggers a negative bias. This question may be addressed by exploiting a sugges-
tion made in passing by Krifka (1995: 255), who suggests that the semantics of
sentences containing indirect questions may convey the felicity conditions of the
corresponding direct questions. I hope to address the issue in future work.
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